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LECTURE 
 
KNOWLEDGE OF THE WORLD AND THE ACT OF JUDGING ♦ 
 
The Right Honourable Lord Justice Jacob∗ 
 
 
In this lecture the author notes that in order for judges to be seen to dispense 
justice they must possess a developed understanding of the world. This has 
important implications for how judges are to be chosen as well as whether, 
and if so how they are to be trained. Judges appointed from the bar will 
likely have a greater knowledge of the world, while a more inclusive, open 
and diverse selection procedure will enhance the prospect that justice will be 
perceived to be done. Judicial training, in turn, may increase judge’s 
knowledge of the world, or at least the perception that justice is being done, 
Ultimately, knowledge of the world is a personal pursuit whose end lies in 
the ability to identify with the other – an instrumentally useful ability for a 
judge, and an inherently worthwhile activity for any person.  
 
 
Lord Chief Justice Hewart once famously said:  “Justice must 
not only be done but must manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be 
done.1”     Did he require more than was necessary?   Is it enough if 
justice is seen to be done:  never mind if it is actually done?   A purist 
might say not.  But hear me out.   In ancient China it is said there was 
a mythical one-horned beast called the xiezhi – the beast of justice.  
You put the plaintiff and defendant on either side of it.   The one it 
touched with its horn lost.  Not only was this much quicker and 
cheaper than all our current procedures, but it satisfied the 
population.   Justice was seen to be done.    From the point of view of 
society all was well.    The same went for trial by ordeal, whether of 
fire, water, knives or some other horror – a process carried out not 
only in mediaeval Europe but in many other countries and cultures. 
                                                           
♦ © 2009 Sir Robin Jacob 
∗  The Right Honourable Lord Justice Jacob, Justice of the Court of Appeal of England 
and Wales, in charge of the Intellectual Property List. The Justice’s remarks were 
delivered at the Congrés de la Magistrature, Québec City, November 2008.  
1 R v. Sussex Justices, Ex parte McCarthy ([1924] 1 KB 256, [1923] All ER 233). 
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Behind these methods of trial was the notion of a God 
directing justice.   Judges derived their authority from God and did 
not need to explain themselves very much.  Incidentally we still have 
vestiges of that – most particularly in the taking of the oath.    
Swearing to tell the truth by Almighty God is the default method for a 
witness – and it can still actually work.  I once had a young Muslim 
man, made to lie by his overbearing and dishonest father, choke as he 
tried to take the oath on the Q’uoran.    
Thing have moved on.  Society now expects the act of judging 
to be carried out by a rational process of assessment and weighing of 
evidence:  not only in relation to fact finding, but also in relation to 
the interpretation of the rules of law itself.  For justice to be seen to be 
done, the modern judge must give reasons – to explain to a critical 
public why he or she decides a case.   And most particularly, for 
justice to be seen to be done, the judge must explain why the losing 
party lost – which involves stating and answering that party’s main 
points.    
What can best place a judge to carry out this task?  I start by 
saying what will not do – pomposity.   A judge is a person of power 
and authority.   There is a real danger it can go to his or her head.   
Common lawyers even have a word for this – “judgitis.”   I do not 
know whether other legal systems have a similar special word: 
whether they do or not I am sure they know the phenomenon. 
In the early years of the industrial revolution and well into 
the 20th century, in my country and I suspect most other common law 
countries, society placed the judge on a particularly high pedestal.  
Society itself encouraged judgitis.   They even wanted it so that it 
could be ridiculed, as they still do.  Here is a story from the 
Edwardian era about a particularly pompous, self-important man 
called Mr Justice Darling.   A celebrity of the time was a music hall 
artist called George Robey – a household name.   There came a case 
where F.E. Smith – later Lord Chancellor – was before Mr Justice 
Darling.   He mentioned George Robey in the course of his address.  
“Who is George Robey?” asked Mr Justice Darling.   F. E. Smith 
smiled:  “Oh my Lord, he is the darling of the music halls.” 
Judgitis continued. In the year 1936 Chief Justice Hewart, in 
his speech to the Lord Mayor’s Banquet:  "Her majesty's judges are 
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satisfied with the almost universal admiration in which they are held."   
And the press said nothing. 
These days I believe that judgitis is a disease somewhat under 
control – though no one should ever think it can be eliminated and 
the fight against it must go on.   It is think a personal fight for each 
judge.    
The next thing to be avoided – an aspect of judgitis - is to 
appear unworldly. As if the things that are part of the life of the 
ordinary citizen are below his or her exalted status.  Legend has it that 
a judge in the 1960s once asked “Who or what are the Beatles?” It was 
a legend – the story is attached to no particular judge, but it was 
credible.  The press have told the story often since and will continue 
to do so.  
So judgitis and remoteness are undesirable attributes.   What 
about those which are desirable?  Following the theme of 
“appearance” with which I started, a modern judge must at least 
appear to have knowledge of the world – I suppose we all ask teenage 
children or grandchildren about the names of popstars and celebs so as 
to at least appear “with it”.  In a music case involving Bruce 
Springsteen, when his counsel got up, I said:  “Now I am supposed to 
ask, who is Bruce Springsteen?” in a what, with hindsight, seems a 
rather pathetic attempt to show I was at one with the common man. 
But appearing to be at one with the common man – to be 
“with it” – is not enough either.   The judge must appear more than 
superficially wordly – he (by which I include she) should in fact be so.  
Sometimes judicial reasoning explicitly appeals to knowledge of the 
world.  Long ago, in 1877, Lord Justice James asked this question in a 
passing off case: 
 
“Now, what could have been the only motive 
which can be suggested to a man of the world by a man of 
the world of the Defendants in doing that”2? 
 
And in considering whether a magistrate was right to hold 
that what was really a permanent garage was not a “structure” because 
it was made of canvas on a fixed frame, Lord Goddard said: 
                                                           
2 Orr-Ewing v Johnson (1877) 13 Ch. D 434 at 451. 
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I think, therefore, that we must hold that the magistrate did 
not direct himself properly in this matter. Had he asked 
himself, as a man of the world, as an ordinary citizen - the 
man on the Stoke Newington bus - whether it was a 
structure. I think that he must have come to the conclusion 
that this was a structure3;     
 
And of course the favourite child of the common law, the 
reasonable man – the man on the Clapham omnibus4 - le bon père de 
famille as you say in Québec - is a man of the world. 
So, from the point of view of public acceptance of what we do, 
we must seem to be in touch – to have knowledge of the world.    
How is that to be achieved?   The only really effective way to seem to 
be something is to be it.  In reality it is not enough to seem to be in 
touch.    You can’t get away with pretending all the time.   So a judge 
actually does require knowledge of the world. 
This truth has important implications in at least two ways:  
how judges are to be chosen, and whether, and if so how, they are to 
be trained. 
I start with judge appointment.   The biggest difference across 
the world is between systems which have career judges and those 
which have judges appointed from practising lawyers.   I once 
discussed this with a distinguished German lawyer who was about 50 
years old at the time.   I said:  “would you like to be a judge?”  After a 
long pause he said:  “You know, I have never thought about it – 
because it is not possible in Germany”.  Then, after another pause, he 
added:  “But, yes.”    I thought ‘what a pity’.  The German judicial 
system was the loser.    I have had similar discussions with French 
lawyers – with much the same response.  The divide broadly follows 
the divide between common law and civil law countries.   A few 
countries, (e.g. Holland), have a mixture between career-only and bar 
appointed judges.   Some throw in the appointment of academics. 
As regards knowledge of the world, I suspect few would 
challenge the proposition that a bar appointed judge is likely to be 
better placed than a career judge.   A judge whose only worldly 
                                                           
3 LCC v Tan  [1954] 1 WLR 371. 
4 Attributed to Lord Bowen. 
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experience is school, law at university, judge school, judicial 
continuing education and actual judging is not given much of a 
chance to learn the ways of the world.   That is not to say that there 
are not many fine civil law judges, for there are.   But it is surely 
easier to judge if one has experience of actual clients and of actual case 
preparation.  The best gamekeepers were once poachers; as the saying 
goes “set a thief to catch a thief”.   There is confirmation from the 
opposite perspective:  a good friend of mine, Jan Brinkhof, was the 
widely respected President of the Court of Appeal in the Hague.   In 
his early 50s he changed course, becoming a practising lawyer for the 
first time.   He says he was surprised to learn what real clients (and 
opponents) were like, that he wished he had had such experience 
when he was a judge.   Another judge I know, Judge Lv Guo Quang, 
Vice President of the Shanghai No.2 Intermediate People’s Court, 
spent three years during the Cultural Revolution out in the country 
planting vegetables and studying the Little Red Book.  He did not like 
it much, but the knowledge of the world he gained has surely helped 
him as man and as a judge. 
I turn to the process of judicial appointment.   I can only 
really talk about what we do in England and Wales (remember 
Scotland is different).   Other countries will have different systems but 
I suspect all of them have moved or will have moved along similar 
lines.   In England it was once simple and cheap – but far from 
“transparent”.  A man from the Lord Chancellor’s Office went round 
the judiciary and a few select others (e.g. the Chairman of the Bar) 
and took what were called “soundings.”   The Lord Chancellor then 
made an appointment.  Formally it was by the Queen – in the case of 
the Court of Appeal and House of Lords judges on the 
recommendation of the Prime Minister.   That is how it was done 
when I was appointed 15 years ago.  Moreover there was no 
requirement of any prior training or judicial experience by way of 
sitting as a deputy judge.   Other countries worried about this sort of 
thing earlier.   Here is a story from the USA:  Chief Justice Burger held 
a conference about judicial appointments where the need for prior 
assessment and training was discussed.  A man from the Lord 
Chancellor’s department was there as an observer.   He was heard to 
murmur:  “I don’t see the problem.  All we do is take a barrister and 
turn him round.” 
26 
 
   
Now things are different.  There is political if not public 
pressure for greater openness and for diversity.   A Judicial 
Appointments Commission was established in April 2006.  It has a lay 
Chairman and 14 Commissioners, five judicial, five professional and 
five lay.   The presence of the lay members shows something 
significant about a public perception that judges should have 
knowledge not merely of law but of the world.  You would not 
sensibly put lay people on a panel choosing a brain surgeon or a 
professor of physics – though I daresay sometimes it is done.   The 
Commission has explicit goals of equal opportunities and diversity of 
race and sex, though at the same time the ultimate criterion is merit. 
It goes about its work in an elaborate and necessarily bureaucratic 
way.  People have to apply to be judges – even write an essay about 
why they think they would be good at it.   Consultation forms are sent 
here there and everywhere – followed by elaborate short-listing and 
interviews.  It costs nearly £9m a year to run – and that does not 
include any of the time put in by consultees.    
Are English judges any more aware of the world, more 
diverse, as a result of all this?  Not so far.  It is early years but the 
number of women or black or Muslim appointees remains low.   It 
will change in the future – simply because more able lawyers of these 
groups are coming through to appointable age.   For myself I doubt 
whether the expensive change from secret soundings has produced 
any better, or indeed, different results.  What has changed is 
perception– the appointees are seen to be chosen more fairly and to be 
more “of the world” than in times past. 
Before finishing with judicial appointment I end with a 
question to which I do not know the answer.  I have noticed that the 
proportion of women judges in Canada seems to be much higher than 
that in England or indeed anywhere else in the common world I have 
been.  I do not know why and would like to.5  I would add that there 
is a very high proportion of women judges in France.   One Judge told 
me why.  She said:  “we are paid very badly – like nurses – so we ‘ave 
‘usbands who earn the money.”     
Next, and briefly, judicial training.  Some countries have long 
had a substantial continuing programme of judicial training.  
                                                           
5 When this talk was delivered, the Honourable Madam Justice Abella provided the 
answer – “in Canada, appointments are on merit.” 
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Germany, which spends more on its judiciary per head of population, 
has two permanent judicial training facilities for its Judges.  In 
England we once had none.  Now we have a Judicial Studies Board 
with an annual budget of about £8m – which of course does not 
include the cost of training provided by judges.   This body clearly 
helps a lot with judicial awareness – and provides an important means 
of keeping judges in touch.  Other countries are increasing judicial 
training – both of a formal kind and the informal kind provided by 
things such as this conference.   
Of course none of this can really make us men or women with 
great knowledge of the world.  It can help somewhat, but really it all 
depends on the individual.  We can but do our best to remain aware, 
to listen, to read. And the wider our experience the more we can 
develop what I think is a key attribute – the ability to put yourself in 
the place of the other man or woman, whether they be litigant or 
witness or anyone else.   This attribute is precious – beyond the courts 
one of the greatest protections against cruelty and one of the greatest 
forces for peace.  The truth is that knowledge of the world, that is to 
say of others, is, or ought to be, an aspiration for everyone, whether 
they are judges or not . 
 
 
 
